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WE SHOULDN’T NEED ROE
Carliss Chatman*

Abstract
In the face of state-by-state attacks on the right to choose,
which result in regular challenges to Roe v. Wade in the U.S.
Supreme Court, this essay asks whether Roe is needed at all.
Decades of state law encroachments have caused Roe to fail to
properly protect the right to choose. Building on prior works that
challenge the premise of fetal personhood and highlighting the
status of Roe-based rights after decades of challenges, this essay
proposes an alternative solution to Roe. Federal legislative and
executive efforts, including the Women’s Health Protection Act,
are necessary to ensure the right to choose remains accessible to
all pregnant persons.1
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Introduction
In May of 2019, I wrote a tweet that has proven to be evergreen.2 It states:
If a fetus is a person at 6 weeks pregnant, is that when the child
support starts? Is that also when you can’t deport the mother
because she’s carrying a US citizen? Can I insure a 6-week
fetus and collect if I miscarry? Just figuring if we’re going here
we should go all in.3

The tweet asks that if a fetus is a person, as many of the recent
laws banning abortion suggest, then why don’t we give fetuses full
access to things ancillary to personhood—including the rights of
citizenship that flow from being born in America?4 The premise
2. See, e.g., Christopher C. Cuomo (@ChrisCuomo), Twitter (Sept. 1,
2021, 12:12 PM), https://twitter.com/ChrisCuomo/status/1433145774381191181
[https://perma.cc/TD7K-NHYB] (shared following the enactment of Texas’s
S.B. 8 in September 2021); Occupy Democrats, Facebook (May 17, 2021, 1:09
PM), https://www.facebook.com/346937065399354/photos/a.347907068635687/
5132960580130288 [perma.cc/RFU7-59NB] (shared following the passage of
Texas’s S.B. 8 in May 2021).
3. Carliss Chatman (@carlissc), Twitter (May 9, 2019, 3:59 AM), https://
twitter.com/carlissc/status/1126441510063542272 [https://perma.cc/H2SFECSV] (posted following the Alabama personhood bill in May 2019).
4. One of the major rights ancillary to personhood is the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall
any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws”). See also Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 605, 611–13 (2016) (constitutional personhood refers to a specific form
of legal personhood that denotes a legal status as a constitutional rights holder,
entitled to the protection under the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution extends
protections to a variety of groups of classification including both “persons” and
“citizens.” The legal distinction between these two groups lies in what types
of rights they may vindicate). Although all persons are guaranteed equal protection under the law, there are some rights that flow from citizenship. The
Fourteenth Amendment asserts the principle of birthright citizenship. For the
framers, citizenship was a matter of race, not birth, and legal personhood was a
matter of race, birth, and gender. For historical and contemporary definitions of
citizenship, see, e.g., Jon Feere, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: A
Global Comparison, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud. (Aug. 2010), https://cis.org/sites/cis.
org/files/birthright-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH5Q-55XF]; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(3) (the term “alien” means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (“The term ‘naturalization’ means the conferring
of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever”);
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898); Naturalization Act of
1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (restricting immigration to free white persons
and limiting citizenship to white men); Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7,
16 Stat. 254 (1870) (amending the Naturalization Act to include African Americans after the Civil War, but excluding non-white immigrants); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that people of African descent were not
American citizens—and never could become citizens, even through an act of
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of the tweet and my subsequent publications5 is simple: persons
and citizens have constitutional guarantees that should not vary
state-by-state.6 Thus, if a fetus is given personhood status, it is owed
equal protection under the law.7 States with fetal personhood laws
Congress. Chief Justice Robert B. Taney wrote, “[Black people were] regarded [by Whites] as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”); Chinese
Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 78-199,
57 Stat. 600 (1943)) (prohibited Chinese people from becoming U.S. citizens);
Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. 134, 137 (Va. 1806); Guyer’s Lessee v. Smith, 22 Md.
239 (Md. 1864) (denying citizenship to the foreign-born children of a Black
father and white mother because foreign born illegitimate children cannot be
citizens); Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 131–32 (Ark. 1857) (noting the application
of the one drop rule follows the maternal line, therefore to be free one must
be born of a free woman); ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604 (1855) (a woman’s legal existence is suspended during marriage, such that a foreign woman who is eligible
for citizenship—namely, a white woman—who marries an American man is an
American).
5. See Carliss N. Chatman, If a Fetus Is a Person, It Should Get Child
Support, Due Process, and Citizenship, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 91 (2020);
BBC World News, Discussion of Texas’s 6Week Abortion Ban, YouTube (May
20, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6mdSLFGi1k; Ipse Dixit, Carliss Chatman and Anthony Kreis on Reproductive Rights, (May 4, 2020), https://
shows.acast.com/ipse-dixit/episodes/carliss-chatman-anthony-kreis-on-reproductive-rights; Josiah Bates, An Alabama Woman Was Charged After Someone
Else Killed Her Fetus. Critics Say New Laws Are ‘Criminalizing Pregnancy,’ Time
(last updated July 3, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://time.com/5616371/alabama-woman-charged-criminalizing-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/P93V-YP7E]; Carliss
Chatman, Why Draconian Anti-Abortion Laws Are Likely Doomed, CNN
(May 29, 2019, 6:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/opinions/supremecourt-abortion-fight-chatman/index.html [https://perma.cc/PLB9-EE5Q];
CBS News, Abortion Bans Create New Legal Issues Regarding Rights of Unborn Children, YouTube (May 21, 2019), https://youtu.be/DakjzejFA-s; C
 arliss
Chatman, If a Fetus Is a Person, It Should Get Child Support, Due Process, and
Citizenship, Wash. Post (May 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/if-a-fetus-is-a-person-it-should-get-child-support-due-process-and-citizenship/2019/05/17/7280ae30-78ac-11e9-b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html [https://
perma.cc/3V3L-5FU8]; Carliss Chatman, What’s Behind the Absurd Gamble on
Women’s Rights and Health, CNN (May 14, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.cnn.
com/2019/05/13/opinions/georgia-alabama-abortion-bills-carliss-chatman/index.
htmlfbclid=IwAR05SDQNc6sK7SxHvRByvAHxLAlyeb886SkD0NaUCWLZ6E4xFviRQ7725vs [https://perma.cc/Z9DF-H8UT].
6. See supra note 4; see also U.S. Const. art. VI (providing that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
18 (1958) (reasoning that Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution
the ‘supreme law of the land,’ and state legislatures are bound by orders of the
U.S. Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the Constitution).
7.
For an analysis of the Equal Protection Clause, see generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection
Doctrine?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1059 (2011); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
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create a legal fiction wherein both the fetus and the pregnant person have full equal protection rights simultaneously. In reality, if
there is conflict, those laws will prioritize the life of the fetus in
all contexts, even if the life of the pregnant person is at risk.8 In
addition, fetal personhood may not end at the borders of the states
with these laws because the idea that fetal personhood in one state
requires equal protection in all states for those fetuses is supported
by the U.S. Constitution and its jurisprudence.9 In other words, fetal
personhood in one state is a slippery slope towards fetal personhood in all states; thus it requires consideration of the full scope its
consequences.
Personhood is the status required to gain access to rights
under the law. Human beings gain their personhood naturally, by
simply being born. Other legal persons gain personhood rights
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Cheryl I. Harris,
Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1753
(2001). For an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment and personhood, see
generally Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Marq. L. Rev. 287 (2017) (explaining that debate regarding the definition of
personhood is one of conflicting values that often spans a variety of religious
traditions. Samar promotes a normative framework that eschews religious beliefs in favor of a pluralistic outcome); Julie A. Nice, The Gendered Jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Rsch. Handbook on Feminist Jurisprudence 343 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019) (explaining
the role of the Equal Protection Clause in the process of women gaining personhood rights).
8. Nice, supra note 7, at 343. See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. Rev.
375 (1985); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261
(1992).
9. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. This conundrum is illustrated by the development of same-sex marriage laws. See Joanna L. Grossman, Civil Rites:
The Gay Marriage Controversy in Historical Perspective, in Law, Soc’y & Hist.:
Themes in the Legal Soc’y & Legal Hist. of Lawrence M. Freidman (Robert
Gordon ed., 2011) (explaining how the Defense of Marriage Act allowed for
varying state laws on gay marriage and served as a work-around for the full
faith and credit clause). While the petitioners briefed the court on the issue of
full faith and credit under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court legalized same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process grounds. Prior to
Obergefell, a network of states legalized same-sex marriage, while other states
refused to legalize those marriages or to recognize the marriages performed in
other states, which appears to be in direct violation of the full faith and credit
clause. See also V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404 (2016) (holding that under the full
faith and credit clause, the state of Alabama did not have the authority to overrule Obergefell).
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from the state—this is how corporations,10 artificial intelligence, and
recently, even animals have gained personhood rights.11 By passing statutes based on fetal personhood, right to life advocates are
creating a hybrid situation. If one need not be born to be a person, is that an attempt to redefine natural, human personhood? Or
is the fetus a new artificial person that is a creature of the state,
with rights defined wholly by the state’s laws? Viewed either way,
the concept of fetal personhood is flawed. With regard to the former interpretation, the Fourteenth Amendment declares that the
federal government,12 not the states, define the personhood and
citizenship of natural persons.13 Moreover, the language of the
10. See Samar, supra note 7; Robinson, supra note 4; Nice, supra note
7. See also Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(expressing the artificial entity theory, under which corporations are artificial
beings and mere creatures of law to whom materialization and rights are conferred when corporations enumerate their raison d’être in their charter—the
state’s requirement to gain access to rights under the law).
11. See Amy Cheng, Pablo Escobar’s ‘Cocaine Hippos’ are Legally People, U.S. Court Rules, Wash. Post (Oct. 26, 2021, 3:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/10/26/pablo-escobar-cocaine-hippos-colombia [https://
perma.cc/RHB9-NBSL]; Carliss N. Chatman, The Corporate Personhood TwoStep, 18 Nev. L.J. 811, 818–19 (2018) (“As early as the 1800s, three distinct theories of the corporation could be found in American jurisprudence. Chief Justice
John Marshall acknowledged corporate personhood rights under the artificial
entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory”) [hereinafter Chatman, Two-Step]; Carliss N. Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The
Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice Following Citizens United, 105 Ky.
L.J. 49, 63 (2016) (highlighting due process limitations that protect the rights
of corporations) [hereinafter Chatman, Judgment Without Notice]; Saru M.
Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnerability: A Feminist Theory of the Person, 20
Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 45, 52–53, 57–64 (2012) (providing a summary of the
personhood of fetuses and other non-humans); Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United
and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 717, 724 (2011) (“[T]his [tiered
personhood] process of granting personhood categorizes and makes separate
levels of legal personhood by excluding some, giving others some rights, and
giving the most privileged full rights—or full political personhood”).
12. The federal judiciary has also played a role in defining personhood.
See Khiara M. Bridges, A Reflection on Personhood and “Life,” 81 Supra 91,
93 (2011) (noting that the Court in Roe v. Wade explicitly found that the fetus
was not a “person” in the constitutional sense and rejected a construction of the
fetus as a “life.” By accepting the fetus as a “life” in subsequent cases, including
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court did not overturn Roe’s finding that the fetus is
not a constitutional person but nonetheless leaves room for personhood bills
and the illegality of abortion. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
13. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”); see Barnes
& Chemerinsky, supra note 7; Hellman, supra note 7; Harris, supra note 7. Following the end of slavery, the application of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been based in nativist notions and stereotypes of the gendered roles of parents
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Constitution clearly contemplates that personhood begins at birth,
not a heartbeat in utero.14 If fetal personhood statutes intend to
alter the definition of being born and not to create a new artificial
legal entity, they are an improper exercise of state power. As for
the artificial entity theory, if a fetus is analogous to a corporation, it
can only act through its agents. While agents act on behalf of their
principals, they cannot disregard the law while serving in that role.
Any agent acting on behalf of the fetus must weigh those actions
against the rights of the natural person whom the fetus relies upon
for its life—the mother.
As any consideration of the agency relationship between
a pregnant person and their fetus—or the rights of a pregnant
person vis-à-vis their fetus—shows, those proposing fetal personhood work to actively deny pregnant persons equal rights.15 The
and the superiority of white people. See Page Act of 1875, Sect. 14, 18 Stat.
477, 3 March 1875, Pub. L. 43–141 (limiting entry of Chinese women because
they were presumed to be prostitutes); see also Roger Daniels, Asian America:
Chinese And Japanese In the United States Since 1850 44 (1990) (quoting
President Grant’s 1874 annual address: “I call the attention of Congress to a
generally conceded fact—that the great proportion of the Chinese immigrants
who come to our shores do not come voluntarily, to make their homes with us
and their labor productive of general prosperity, but come under contracts with
headmen, who own them absolutely. In a worse form does this apply to Chinese
women. Hardly a perceptible percentage of them perform any honorable labor,
but they are brought for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of communities
where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth of those localities.
If this evil practice can be legislated against, it will be my pleasure as well as my
duty to enforce any regulation to secure so desirable an end.”); see Ozawa v. US,
260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that Japanese citizens were ineligible for U.S. citizenship under the naturalization laws because the law was limited to “free white
persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”);
see also US v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (cancelling the defendant’s certificate
of naturalization because although he was high caste Hindu, he was not a white
person); Dow v. U.S., 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915) (classifying some Asian people,
including Syrians, as white persons free to immigrate to the United States); 8
U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 2409(a) (to secure citizenship for nonmarital foreign-born
children born after November 14, 1968, a father must provide proof of paternity
and proof of financial support before age eighteen); Nationality Act of 1940,
ch. 876 §§ 201–5, 54 stat. 1137, 1138–40 (1940) (establishing citizenship, immigration, and naturalization rules); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (mother of non-marital
foreign-born child need only be in the United States for one year at any point
in her life to obtain citizenship); Nguyen v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 533
U.S. 53, 56–57 (2001) (espousing a biological justification for disparate immigration and naturalization policies).
14. See supra notes 4 and 12. See also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (recognizing birthright citizenship where the Constitution confers personhood status
and thus grants citizenship rights once the person in question is born on U.S.
soil).
15. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race,

2022

We Shouldn’t Need Roe

87

state-by-state campaign for fetal personhood is simply the latest
attempt to deny pregnant persons the right to choose, because it is
impossible to give a fetus autonomy without eliminating the autonomy of the person carrying that fetus.16 The fetus is the strawman in
a movement of oppression that has attempted to roll back the rights
recognized in Roe v. Wade for nearly a half-century. The outcome
of the anti-abortion movement is not equal protection for fetuses,
particularly since concern for their well-being seems to end at their
birth.17 The goal of fetal personhood advocates is superior protection for fetuses in exchange for unequal protection for mothers.
The rights acknowledged by the Fourteenth Amendment
have, thus far, prevented a total ban on abortion. The Fourteenth
Amendment mandates that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.18 In other words,
states no longer have the right to define my personhood.19 Instead,
Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky &
Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1189
(2017) (noting the Court’s outright indifference to interests of poor and working class women in obtaining abortion access); Michele Goodwin & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 Yale L.J. 1270 (2018); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Fetal Equality, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 123 (2020); Melissa
Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for Roe
v. Wade, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2025, 2046–47 (2021) (discussing the enforcement of
moral offenses and infringements on rights of pregnant women of color).
16. Michele Goodwin, Pregnancy and the New Jane Crow, 53 Conn. L.
Rev. 543 (2021) (arguing that protecting fetal health justifies a broader political
agenda, including antiabortion laws such as Texas’s S.B. 8 and criminal punishments for stillbirths and miscarriages, whose targets are no longer confined to
poor Black women. Instead, the state’s historical targeting of that population
is now the precedent on which broader political and policing agendas are built.
Today, fetal protection-related punishments materialize in cases of miscarriages,
stillbirths, refusal for end-of-life care, and even in instances wherein pregnant
patients refuse cesarean operations); Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance:
Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1285, 1334 (2013)
(“Essentially, the protection of fetal ‘life’ will defeat a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy under all balancing tests, from the undue burden standard
to strict scrutiny. ‘Life,’ as culturally constructed, is such a weighty proposition
that it necessarily outweighs any individual right or liberty.”).
17. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1706 (2008) (observing that the
anti-abortion movement opposed protecting women’s right to choose).
18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. See supra note 10; see also Chatman, Judgment Without Notice, supra
note 11, at 63 (showing that granting corporations personhood status also offers
protections like due process under the Constitution, which requires states to
develop regulations to ensure that corporations receive notice of suit reasonably calculated so that they are allowed an opportunity to present objections).
See also Garrett Epps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don’ts and
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my equality is constitutionally guaranteed.20 Equal protection
means equal protection for all legal persons—such that an artificial person’s rights are not superior to a natural person’s, a man’s
rights are not greater than a woman’s, and a white person’s rights
are not stronger than a Black person’s.21 Although fetal personhood laws defy this premise, the current composition of the courts
all but assures that at least one of the latest attempts to rollback
reproductive rights will succeed.22
In this Essay I suggest that for all persons to avail themselves
of the right to choose, the current paradigm calls for action at the
federal level. Notably, the only federal actions on abortion so far
have infringed on the right to choose through measures such as the
Hyde Amendment and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban.23 Building
on prior works that challenge the premise of fetal personhood and
highlighting the status of Roe-based rights after decades of challenges, this Essay proposes an alternative to Roe.24 The Supreme
Three Dos, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 433 (2007) (explaining how the use of
words like “person” rather than “citizen” allowed the Fourteenth Amendment
to proliferate robust protections extending to African Americans, women, and
immigrants); Joel K. Goldstein, Teaching the Transformative Fourteenth Amendment, 62 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 581 (2018) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment altered the constitutional legal structure by extending rights enshrined in
the Bill of Rights to protect individuals.).
20. See supra notes 9–11; see also Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article
IV, and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Am. U.L. Rev. 351 (1997);
Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination
and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232, 237 (1965).
21. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Loving v. Virginia to Washington
v. Davis: The Erosion of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Intent Analysis,
25 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 303 (2018); Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky &
Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection, 98 Geo. L.J. 967 (2010).
22. S.B. 2116, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019) (prohibiting abortion of
fetus with detectable heartbeat); H.B. 314, 2019 Leg., Res. Sess. (Ala. 2019)
(making abortion into a felony offense with a few exceptions in Alabama).
23. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96–123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979);
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, 117 Stat. 1201, 18
U.S.C. § 1531; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on the grounds that it did not impose an undue
burden on the due process rights of women to obtain an abortion under Roe
and Casey. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent advocates for basing abortion jurisprudence in personal autonomy and equal citizenship instead of privacy).
24. Many scholars have addressed the shortcomings of basing reproductive rights on Roe. See, e.g., Noya Rimalt, When Rights Don’t Talk: Abortion
Law and the Politics of Compromise, 28 Yale J.L. & Feminism 327, 363–64 (2017);
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1397, 1400 (2009); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev.
375, 385–86 (1985).
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Court should not need to be swayed by proponents of the right
to choose.25 The time has passed for lobbying individual state legislatures and hoping and praying that favorable justices retire at
the right time or survive until the next Democratic administration.
Instead, the other branches of the federal government should provide the protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

I.

Courts and States as Unreliable Allies in the Fight
for Reproductive Choice

At the heart of the issue is how to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment’s definitions of personhood and citizenship to state
attempts to define fetal personhood. Our system of government has
allowed states to define the personhood of unnatural creatures—
such as corporations—from very early in our nation’s history.26 In
exchange for this freedom, states are not permitted to go back on
their deal.27 In other words, once personhood rights are granted, a
state may not deny the entity life, liberty, or property without due
process, nor may a state deny equal protection under the law. On
the other hand, since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
states have not had the right to define the personhood of natural
people. This is a subject—determined either by place of birth or by
complying with immigration and naturalization requirements—for
the Constitution and federal law. State grants of natural personhood to fetuses challenge this norm. No state has clarified whether
their fetal personhood statute creates a new artificial entity or
changes the definition of what it means to be a naturally occurring person, but that distinction could impact the constitutionality
of fetal personhood laws.
Currently, a pregnant person’s personhood rights change
when they cross state lines, because in every state with a fetal personhood law, their personhood is inferior to the personhood of a
fetus.28 In direct violation of the equal protection guaranteed by the
25. Anthony Michael Kreis, Under Ten Eyes, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 107
(2020); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 61, 106–07
(noting how the Court selectively disregards precedent in abortion cases);
Murray, supra note 15 at 2075–77 (noting Thomas’s denouncement of stare decisis). See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)
(declaring unconstitutional a law meant to ensure women are provided accurate
information regarding reproductive health services).
26. See Chatman, TwoStep, supra note 11, at 818–19.
27. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636
(1819).
28. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Setting the Record Straight on Measuring Fetal
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Fourteenth Amendment, states with fetal personhood laws make a
comparative personhood decision by prioritizing the fetus over the
mother; this decision is not only a deprivation of the mother’s liberty, but can at times result in the end of her life.29
While all women have personhood and the corresponding
rights acknowledged by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution does not guarantee female autonomy.30 Instead, the idea
that women have the legal agency and capacity to make all decisions, be they financial or regarding their own health care, has
developed incrementally over centuries.31 The current status of full
legal autonomy, in which a woman has the right to take an active
and definitive role in her own well-being, free from the control of a
husband or other patriarch, the right to a workplace free of discrimination, and even the right to be protected from violence developed
far later than most people realize.32
In 1973, Roe established a constitutional right to abortion
based in a right to privacy, which is an outgrowth of the due process
Age and the ‘20-Week Abortion,’ Wash. Post (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/05/26/setting-the-record-straighton-measuring-fetal-age-and-the-20-week-abortion [https://perma.cc/J57EQH8T].
29. Between 4.7-13.2 percent of maternal deaths are caused by a lack of
access to abortion. Lale Say, Doris Chou, Alison Gemmill, Özge Tunçalp, AnnBeth Moller, Jane Daniels, A. Metin Gülmezoglu, Marleen Temmerman, and
Leontine Alkema, Global Causes of Maternal Death: A WHO Systematic Analysis; 2 Lancet Glob. Health 323, 326 (2014).
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also, e.g., Nice, supra note 7;
Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice From the South 134 (1892); Murray & Eastwood,
supra note 20; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (2nd ed., 1999) (describing
a “matrix of domination” structured along multiple axes including race, class,
and gender, on multiple levels); Roberts, supra note 15.
31. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that there is no
protection to practice trade, privileges and immunities does not apply the Bill
of Rights to the states, and equal protection only applies to race); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that women may be excluded from the practice of law because doing so is not a privilege of citizenship); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the private sphere is protected from congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of
D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (holding that there is no constitutional right to a minimum
wage); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that women may
not work as bartenders unless the bar is owned by their husband or father);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding a maximum hour law for
women). In these decisions, the mere possibility of motherhood was weaponized to exclude women from full and equal participation in the workforce.
32. See Kreis, supra, note 25 (discussing the Supreme Court’s ongoing
failure to recognize female autonomy). See also note 30 (discussing the same).
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protection of liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey refined and clarified Roe, holding that abortion
restrictions are unconstitutional when they place an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.33 Many
anti-abortion laws rely on fetal heartbeats and fetal personhood as a
means of redefining when viability (and life) begins, with the hopes
of coming within the parameters of Casey. The Casey undue burden standard has given states the ability to impose restrictions that
target providers and impose waiting periods and diagnostic testing
that are not medically necessary, all under the guise of protecting
the health of mothers and the unborn.34 In the twenty-three states
with such targeted restrictions on abortion providers (TRAP) laws
that have reduced or eliminated access to abortion, pregnant persons live in a world without the protection of Roe for a procedure
that, at times, is essential healthcare needed to preserve their life.35
This risk of death is just one illustration of how the so-called prolife movement is not about the sanctity of life generally.
In states with restrictive TRAP laws, the right to an abortion, as it currently stands, fails to encompass the personhood and
autonomy of women, resulting in a reversal of developments that
required generations to gain. If the Supreme Court overturns Roe,
female personhood and autonomy will return to the not-so-distant past, and a variation of the two-tiered system of permissive
and restrictive abortion states that exists today would be solidified. Should a Black woman on Medicare in Mississippi find herself
faced with an unplanned pregnancy, the state will infringe upon her
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy and her human right to
autonomy. Meanwhile, a similarly situated Black woman in California has the constitutional rights she deserves as a free and
competent human being.
In an amicus brief by the Howard University School of Law
Human and Civil Rights Clinic in support of the respondents in
33. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also supra
note 25.
34. See John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the
Future of Abortion Regulation, 7 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 623 (2017); see also supra
notes 25 and 30.
35. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Inst. (Mar. 1, 2022),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws?gclid=CjwKCAiA8bqOBhANEiwA-sIlN9iS-7nJqt0XCi3lpJKPMHT1jK2RMwfO9nR2QEcuveqJ0SonHAQkOBoCB6MQAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/
GZU7-TENS] (thirty-six states require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician; nineteen states require an abortion to be performed in a hospital after a specified point in the pregnancy; and seventeen states require the
involvement of a second physician after a specified point).
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Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, an abortion case
the Supreme Court heard in its 2021–2022 term, the clinic highlights the impact of states’ historical medical and legal regulation
of Black women’s reproduction.36 The brief profiles the legacy of
reproductive control from forced reproduction during enslavement,
to sexual terrorism during Reconstruction, to the movements for
compulsory sterilization at the turn of the twentieth century, to
the modern era featuring disproportionate access to birth control
and other forms of reproductive freedom.37 Because the impacts
of systemic racism result in Black women’s greater need for public assistance for health care and have prevented Black women
from gaining full access to reproductive freedom, state measures to
eliminate the right to choose also disproportionately impact Black
women.38 When combined with the failures of the health care system that result in disproportionate infant and maternal mortality
rates, the state laws highlighted below operate as a death sentence
for some pregnant persons.39 Forty-eight years of leaving this
debate to the whims of the states and the courts has resulted in a
system that disproportionately subjects the poor, women in rural
areas, and women of color to the negative consequences of a lack of
access to health care, including access to abortion care.40
Even if the pro-choice movement is successful in Dobbs and
the Texas S.B. 8 litigation, states will not stop attempting to overturn
Roe outright, or at least to continue with incremental infringements
on the right to choose.41 Dobbs is a case regarding Mississippi’s law
that bans abortion at fifteen weeks of pregnancy,42 which falls far
short of the viability timeframe imposed by Casey.43 There are
36. Brief for How. Univ. Sch. L. Hum. & C.R. Clinic as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct.
2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392).
37. Id. See also Mallori D. Thompson, The Scales of Reproductive Justice:
Casey’s Failure to Rebalance Liberty Interests in the Racially Disparate State of
Maternal Medicine, 26 Mich. J. Race & L. 241 (2020); supra notes 15–16.
38. Brief for How. Univ. Sch. L. Hum. & C.R. Clinic, supra note 37; see
also Thompson, supra note 38; supra notes 15–16.
39. Brief for How. Univ. Sch. L. Hum & C.R. Clinic, supra note 37; see
also Thompson, supra note 38; supra notes 15–16.
40. See, e.g., Mary Tuma, Most Extreme Abortion Law in US Takes Effect
in Texas, Guardian (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/
sep/01/texas-abortion-law-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/G9E9-X53A];
Thompson, supra note 37; see also sources cited supra notes 22, 50–54 and accompanying text.
41. See sources cited supra note 20 and accompanying text.
42. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-191(4) (2022).
43. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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no exceptions for incest or rape.44 To obtain an abortion after fifteen weeks, a pregnant person would have to be facing a medical
emergency that causes substantial impairment or endangers their
life, or a doctor would have to determine that a fetus carried to
term would not survive. In its July 22, 2021 brief, Mississippi was
finally direct in its request—the state explicitly asked the Court to
overturn Roe.
This is not Mississippi’s first attempt to restrict abortion access
nor its first attempt to overturn Roe. In 2019, Mississippi passed
House Bill 529, a fetal heartbeat bill.45 Like all previous state fetal
heartbeat bills, it did not survive. U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves,
who is also responsible for blocking the fifteen-week ban that is
the focus of Dobbs, ruled that the fetal heartbeat bill unequivocally violated a woman’s constitutional rights, as it “disregards the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of autonomy for women desiring to control their own reproductive health.” In the face of clear
Supreme Court precedent, and despite countless failed attempts,
states persist in trying to roll back abortion access.46 We cannot
stop the war on women’s rights in the courts. State legislatures
have been waiting for this moment, in which the right administration could fill the Supreme Court with at least five justices willing to
overturn clear precedent.47
Other states are also undeterred by previous court losses. A
Texas TRAP law was challenged in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, a 2017 Supreme Court decision.48 Hellerstedt held that
House Bill 2 from Texas’s 2013 legislative session, which required
abortion providers to have admitting privileges a hospital within
thirty miles and abortion facilities to meet the same standards as
ambulatory surgery centers or a hospital room, created an undue
burden for women seeking an abortion. Yet, in each session since
Hellerstedt, eliminating the right to choose has remained a priority
for the Texas legislature.
During Texas’s 2021 legislative session, anti-choice legislators introduced numerous bills designed to restrict abortion. On
May 19, 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed the Texas Heartbeat Act (S.B. 8), a fetal heartbeat ban that bans abortions as early
as six weeks.49 S.B. 8 intentionally takes a unique approach meant
44. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-191 (2022).
45. Fetal heartbeat bills seek to ban abortion as early as six weeks, when
a fetal heartbeat may first be detected.
46. See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016).
49. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.201.
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as an end run around the current undue burden standard. It is
not enforced by the state Attorney General, as most laws are. It
is instead enforced by any private individual, including those outside of Texas, who may sue an abortion provider or anyone else
who helps someone get an abortion, and receive as much as $10,000
from each defendant. Even a cab or ride share driver who transports someone to get an abortion could be included in a lawsuit.
Notably, the onus is on the accused to prove they did not assist a
pregnant person in obtaining an abortion—the law in essence provides for litigation by gossip.
On July 13, 2021, abortion rights organizations filed a class
action suit for declaratory and injunctive relief under to block
S.B. 8.50 The petitioners include nonprofits such as Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Center for Reproductive Rights, and
Whole Women’s Health. The petitioners’ alleged that S.B. 8 “flagrantly violates” the constitutional protections for Texans seeking
abortions on several grounds.51 Citing the clear precedent that
establishes that a state may not prohibit abortion before viability,
the complaint calls out the procedural trickery, noting that in all situations the right to choose belongs to the individual.52 In addition,
the suit challenged the new fee shifting penalty for legal challenges
to abortion restrictions.53
Unfortunately, the procedural complexity of S.B. 8 enabled
Texas to take advantage of the current composition of the Supreme
Court to implement a de facto ban on abortion. As a result of the
5–4 decision issued by the Court on September 1, 2021, the law
is in effect. An unsigned opinion from a majority comprised of
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett stated that the petitioners failed to
address the complex and novel antecedent procedural questions.54
The majority relied on procedure to allow S.B. 8 to go into effect
without any consideration of the impact of the law or whether it
is constitutional. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by
50. Heidi Pérez-Moreno, Twenty Abortion Providers Sue Texas Officials
Over Law That Bans Abortions as Early as Six Weeks, Tex. Tribune (Jul. 13,
2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/07/13/texas-heartbeat-bill-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/5VSU-BA2H].
51. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Jackson, 556 F. Supp. 3d. 595 (2021) (No. 21-cv-00616-RP), 2021 WL
2945846, at *2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5 (arguing that imposing the fee-shifting penalty would deter
any challenges, including meritorious challenges, to state and local abortion restrictions).
54. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021).
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Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, emphasizes the reality
of the legislation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor notes that the legislature accomplished its goal of deputizing private citizens to act as
bounty hunters and eliminating state action to create a complicated
legal morass that is difficult to challenge.55 Since it was enacted and
throughout the litigation surrounding its constitutionality, S.B. 8 has
almost completely eliminated the right to choose in Texas, as most
women are not even aware that they are pregnant at six weeks.
While Texas’s bill clearly violates Roe, the procedural complexity allowed it to persist. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
filed for a temporary injunction to block enforcement of the bill.56
At a hearing on October 1, 2021, lawyers for the Texas Attorney
General’s Office (Texas AG) acknowledged the law’s deliberate and intentional inconvenience to women. However, the Texas
AG noted the need to travel to Oklahoma, New Mexico, and even
states further away results in a net positive, as it increases interstate
commerce. The Texas AG also doubled down on the procedural
complexity, claiming that not even the DOJ could proceed in an
action intended to be enforced by private citizens.
In a 113 page opinion, District Court Judge Robert Pitman
granted the DOJ’s request to stop enforcement of S.B. 8, declaring in his opinion, yet again, that Roe and the right to choose is
the law of the land and that a law that infringes on constitutional
rights should not be allowed to stand without review.57 Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, is unmoved by
these infringements. Just two days after Judge Pitman’s order, a
three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit granted a stay of the order
pending the outcome of the State of Texas’s appeal. During the two
days of relief between Judge Pitman’s order and the Fifth Circuit’s
stay of that order, only a handful of the twenty-four abortion clinics
in Texas began providing services again, as most were not sure what
would happen if they performed abortions on those days but were
later faced with a reinstatement of the law.
This chaos and confusion, which leaves women unsure of their
rights while the parties battle in court, is a scenario desired by some
states because it effectively halts abortions. By late September
2021, Representative Webster Barnaby introduced a similar bill in
55. Id. at 2498.
56. Press Release, Merrick B. Garland, Att’y Gen., Statement from Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Regarding Texas SB 8 (Sept. 6, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-
regarding-texas-sb8-0 [https://perma.cc/KV46-BNUT].
57. U.S. v. Texas, No. 1:21-CV-796-RP, 2021 WL 4593319, at *29 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 6, 2021).
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Florida’s state legislature. John Seago, the Legislative Director of
Texas Right to Life, the group that helped to draft S.B. 8, announced
that he was working with at least three other states to draft similar
laws. Officials in Arkansas, South Carolina, and South Dakota have
all suggested they will attempt to follow Texas’s example.58
Given Alabama’s previous efforts to restrict abortion, they
may be the next to take the Texas approach. Around the time I
wrote the tweet in 2019, Alabama joined the growing number of
states determined to overturn Roe by banning abortion from conception forward.59 The Alabama Human Life Protection Act, which
at the time was the most restrictive abortion law in the country,
subjected a doctor who performs an abortion to as many as ninety-nine years in prison. The law had no exceptions for rape or
incest. It redefined an “unborn child, child or person” as “[a] human
being, specifically including an unborn child in utero at any stage of
development, regardless of viability.” This Alabama law redefined
personhood, potentially extending the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to fetuses in the state. On October 29, 2019,
Judge Myron Thompson prevented the ban from going into effect,
holding that “Alabama’s abortion ban contravenes clear Supreme
Court precedent. It violates the right of individual privacy, to make
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. It diminishes the
capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions. It defies the United States Constitution.”60 Courts to date
have agreed with Judges Thompson and Reeves, yet anti-choice legislators have persisted, operating as if a reversal of Roe in the courts
is a fait accompli.61 Texas’s procedural end run may allow states to
give force to draconian measures that have been unsuccessful to
date in light of Roe.
In addition to the statutes described above, many states
stand ready for the Supreme Court to reverse Roe. Trigger laws
will automatically ban abortions in the first and second trimesters
of pregnancy if the Supreme Court overturns Roe. Trigger laws
will either reinstate pre-Roe laws or implement new ones, including many of the laws discussed above. Twelve states have enacted
these measures: Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
58. Meryl Kornfield, Caroline Anders & Audra Heinrichs, Texas Created
a Blueprint for Abortion Restrictions. Republican-Controlled States May Follow Suit, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2021, 8:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2021/09/03/texas-abortion-ban-states [https://perma.cc/5VSU-BA2H].
59. The Alabama Human Life Protection Act, Ala. Code § 2623H1
(2019).
60. Robinson v. Marshall, 415 F.Supp.3d 1053, 1059 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
61. See, e.g., supra note 24.
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Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.
Eight states never repealed their pre-Roe abortion bans, and it can
be assumed that those bans will also go into effect should the case
fall. Those states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.62
The right of women to control their bodies has for decades
depended on the composition of the Supreme Court and individual state legislatures.63 Since Roe, states have tested the limits of
the viability line, and since Casey, they have tested the definition
of an undue burden. The cycle of legislation followed by litigation
creates a period of uncertainty in which a woman’s right to choose
is in flux or eliminated by the amount of time it takes to challenge
a bill in court.64 Even when the measures fail, the period of limbo
has a chilling effect on abortion access that is, in many instances,
insurmountable. As state legislators play a game each session that
they have, up until recently, been sure to lose, they force abortion
providers to close, impose additional restrictions, or engage in the
weighty task of educating the public that they are still operating.
The current composition of the Court ensures that the incremental attacks on the right to choose will persist, and, in the meantime,
fewer women will have access to abortion services.

62. Elizabeth Nash & Lauren Cross, 26 States Are Certain or Likely to
Ban Abortion Without Roe: Here’s Which Ones and Why, Guttmacher Inst.
(Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/10/26-states-are-
certain-or-likely-ban-abortion-without-roe-heres-which-ones-and-why [https://
perma.cc/MWY9-AY4Z].
63. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down an abortion law
requiring a 24-hour waiting period and mandatory requirements for patient
disclosures); Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that federal and
state governments can deny funding for abortion even if funding is provided
for child birth); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on the grounds that it did not impose an undue
burden on the due process rights of women to obtain an abortion under Roe
and Casey. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent advocates for basing abortion jurisprudence in personal autonomy and equal citizenship instead of privacy); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016) (ruling that Texas could not
place some TRAP restrictions on abortion providers).
64. Alexandra Svokos, How Unprecedented the Texas Abortion Law Is in
Scope of History, ABC News (Sept. 3, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
US/unprecedented-texas-abortion-law-scope-history/story?id=79793375
[https://perma.cc/RVQ3-7SR5].
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A Federal Solution

America has a persisting equality problem.65 At no time in
our nation’s history has a movement for national equal protection
under the law been successful at the state level alone.66 The fight for
the right to choose is no exception. Just as federal action was necessary to protect constitutionally mandated civil rights and voting
rights and to make these rights uniform across the country, federal
action is now required to protect the personhood rights of women.67
Decades of a vicious cycle of abortion ban followed by litigation and an incremental infringement on the right to choose proves
that a state-by-state, court-by-court solution is not the answer.68 It
will be detrimental to women’s health if the Supreme Court allows
any of the statutes described in the previous Part to stand. And it
will be even more detrimental if Congress does not see the writing
on the wall and use its current composition to preserve and restore
these protections.
Reproductive rights are as important as other rights that have
compelled Congress to act in the face of state infringement. Yet,
over the years Congress has either ignored the right to choose or
restricted access with measures such as the Hyde Amendment, a
provision that received bipartisan support.69 The Hyde Amendment
65. Carliss Chatman, Citizens United Rewritten, Feminist Judgments
(forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (arguing that America has a matrix
of domination that affects all women in different ways depending on their race,
class, sexuality, and marital status); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874)
(holding that the privileges and immunities clause does not give women the
right to vote); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the private
sphere is protected from Congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. See supra notes 4, 12, 21 and accompanying text.
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (a 1965 law
aimed at alleviating discriminatory barriers to voting access to African Americans at the state level); Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88–353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(strengthening the enforcement of voting rights as well as facilitated the desegregation of schools. The Act barred discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin).
68. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 US 179 (1973); see supra notes 29–41 and
accompanying text.
69. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding measures by
Congress denying public funding for abortion); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that federal and state governments can deny
funding for abortion even if funding is provided for child birth); Poelker v. Doe,
432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); Gonalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on the grounds that it did not impose an undue
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prohibits federal funds from covering abortion services for people
enrolled in Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).70 Due to the demographics of the women
most likely to need these federal assistance programs, it acts as
an intersectional discriminatory measure that disproportionately
impacts women of color.71 Abortion services are health care, and
the right to choose is constitutionally protected, but the politicization of abortion has meant that even members of Congress who
claim to support the right to choose have done nothing to prevent
its erosion in the states and the courts.72 Decades of federal legislators’ moderation and neutrality have only aided the movement
to eliminate abortion access.73 For the women in Texas, Mississippi,
and other states with restrictive abortion laws, Congress’s procedural requirements—such as the maneuvers necessary to overcome
a filibuster—and political calculations leave them to face irreparable harm.
When states define natural personhood with the goal of
overturning Roe,74 they are inadvertently creating a system with
two-tiered fetal citizenship.75 In some states, fetuses are persons
subject to protection by the Fourteenth Amendment, while in
other states the law does not acknowledge fetuses as separate legal
entities. Yet, as noted in the previous Part, in no state is there clarification as to whether the law intends the fetal person to be a shift in
the definition of natural personhood or the creation of a new artificial legal person. The holdings of Roe and Casey help create this
two-tiered system because they establish a federal floor for access
to the right to choose—a rule that some ability to abort a fetus
exists in the United States before viability—but the cases do not
guarantee access to abortion without any state-created limits.
Because of the structure of our government, if the Supreme
Court overturns these cases, that eliminates only the federal right
to abortion access. Overturning Roe would not prohibit a state
from continuing to allow access. In a postRoe world, in states such
as New York that ensure the right to choose through their constitutions and statutes, citizenship will begin at birth.76 In states that
burden on the due process rights of women to obtain an abortion under Roe
and Casey); see also Rimalt, supra note 24, at 267–73.
70. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96–123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979).
71. See supra notes 36–39.
72. See e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 51.
73. Id.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. See supra notes 7–11.
76. N.Y. Pub. Health Law, § 2599aa (McKinney 2019).
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move the line to define life as early as conception, personhood and
citizenship will begin as soon as a person knows they are pregnant.
To solidify the federal floor and raise it so that all persons have the
right to choose, Congress can act to provide much needed clarity
and eliminate the ability of states to infringe upon a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy and equal citizenship rights. These rights
are so fundamental, that it should not be possible for the Supreme
Court to eliminate them by simply overturning Roe and Casey.
The Constitution does not intend for equal protection to be
state-dependent or subjective. Even in a federalist structure, constitutional protections should be consistent. States are government
actors who do not have the right to redefine what it means to be a
person or citizen. A pregnant person’s rights should not be determined by whether a legislature has a grasp on science. Not when the
language of the Constitution clearly states that personhood begins
at birth, not a heartbeat in utero.77 Through fetal personhood laws,
states have invoked a system of comparative personhood that places
a fetus above a pregnant woman—a paradigm that is patently unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection. Defining citizenship and
personhood based on the laws of each state, as proposed by the
numerous measures to eliminate the right to choose, creates some
farfetched and even ridiculous scenarios as outlined in my tweet. If
we allow this to persist without federal legislative intervention, we
will tie our Constitution into a knot no court can untangle. Fortunately, there is a solution that can avoid these absurd consequences.
The Women’s Health Protection Act (WHPA) ensures equal
access to abortion for all women in all states.78 The measure, first
introduced in 2013, is the work of the Pro-Choice Caucus. Representative Judy Chu (D-CA) has introduced the WHPA every session
since 2013, and it was reintroduced in the 117th Congress with 176
supporters in the House and 48 in the U.S. Senate. WHPA ensures
the right to choose even if the Supreme Court overturns Roe. On
September 24, 2021, the WHPA passed in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Senate blocked the bill on February 28, 2022, with a
46–48 Yea-Nay vote.79 If the Senate gets rid of the filibuster, WHPA
could pass with a simple majority instead of 60-vote threshold.80 If
77. See supra notes 7–11.
78. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S.1645, 116th Cong. (2019).
79. For the status of the WHPA, see Women’s Health Protection Act of
2021, H.R. 3755, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).
80. Alison Durkee, Could the Senate Guarantee Abortion Rights Nationwide? Here’s Why It’s Still Unlikely, Forbes (May 3, 2022, 4:44 PM) https://www.
forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2022/05/03/could-the-senate-guarantee-abortionrights-nationwide-heres-why-its-still-unlikely/?sh=3a5302484adf [https://perma.
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the Senate passes the WHPA and the bill becomes law, the right to
choose would survive even if the Supreme Court overturns Roe.81
By passing one bill, Congress could undo the infringements of the
past while also putting a stop to the harmful statutes and subsequent case law that weaken the intended impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The rights of marginalized persons, even those that
are foundational such as liberty, freedom, and autonomy, are not so
clearly established that they can be left to the states. The right to
an abortion requires reinforcement through congressional action.
Resolving this matter to protect the constitutional rights of
women is not outside of the scope of congressional power. At many
junctures in our nation’s history, it has been evident that we cannot rely on states to provide equal protection. In fact, since the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments realigned our
government to instill the power of equal protection squarely within
the domain of the federal government, it has always taken an act of
Congress to guarantee any measure of equal protection under the
law.82 Congress has acknowledged state infringements on constitutional rights and provided a remedy in the past with measures such
as the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination, and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which protects people from discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs
or activities that receive federal funds, are the result of Congress
recognizing the need to intervene to ensure equal protection.83
cc/LPN4-UAMG] (noting that it is unlikely that the WHPA could get a simple
majority because Senators Joe Manchin (D-W. VA), and pro-abortion rights Republican senators Susan Collins (Maine) and Lisa Murkowski (Alaska) voted
against it in February).
81. Ian Millhiser, Democrats Have a High-Risk, High-Reward Plan to
Save Roe v. Wade: The Women’s Health Protection Act, Explained, Vox (Sept.
8, 2021), https://www.vox.com/20930358/codify-roe-wade-womens-health-
protection-act-supreme-court-nancy-pelosi-democrats [https://perma.cc/
TC5B-QPJN].
82. See supra note 11.
83. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13)
(“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex [under Title VII], Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”); see also
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Equal Access to Education: Forty Years of Title IX 2
(June 23, 2012) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/
titleixreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5QL-77NE] (“Congress passed Title IX
in response to the marked educational inequalities women faced prior to the
1970s.”).
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Although abortion is technically legal in all fifty states, many
women are either geographically limited in their access84 or face a
procedural morass that in essence eliminates the right to choose.85
The WHPA resolves this injustice. Should the WHPA become law,
health care providers, individuals harmed by state abortion laws
that infringe on the right to choose, and the DOJ all can enforce the
rights enumerated in the WHPA in court. This is especially important in light of bills similar to S.B. 8, which creates a procedural bar
to abortion through a private right of action. The WHPA establishes a statutory right for health care providers to provide, and
their patients to receive, abortion care without medically unnecessary restrictions, limitations, and bans that delay—and at times,
completely obstruct—access to abortion. Constitutionally, this
would prevent the operation of S.B. 8 The doctrine of federal preemption, based on the Supremacy Clause, allows a federal act to
stop state behavior that interferes or conflicts with federal law.86 As
the supreme law of the land, not only would the WHPA eliminate
the need for Roe, but it would also enable parties to immediately
challenge the state-level restrictions that currently exist.
There are also opportunities for the Executive Branch to act.87
Yet, the Executive Branch seems to have chosen to leave the pregnant persons in Texas without access to abortion and the rights of
other pregnant persons in limbo as we await a decision on the pending Mississippi case. Given the tenuous status of access to abortion,
a failure to utilize all branches of the federal government to protect
the right to an abortion is a declaration of a position. The Biden
administration’s failure to issue an executive order, and Congress’s
failure to pass legislation in the face of the current situation, is representative of an anti-choice position.
Joe Biden’s position on the right to choose has evolved since
his decades of support for the Hyde Amendment and vote in favor
of the partial birth abortion ban.88 In the past, Biden has stated
84. Jessie Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, 109 Geo. L.J. 1081,
1086 (2021) (arguing that abortion restrictions that interact with state borders
reinforce inequality by limiting women’s access to abortion in several states).
85. See id. at 1087–91.
86. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
87. See e.g., David S. Cohen, Greer Donley and Rachel Rebouché, Joe
Biden Can’t Save Roe v. Wade Alone. But He Can Do This, N.Y. Times (Dec.
30, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/30/opinion/abortion-pills-biden.html
[https://perma.cc/AQ4R-567G] (proposing that the Biden administration advocate for a preemption argument or lease federal land to abortion providers).
88. Katie Glueck, Joe Biden Denounces Hyde Amendment, Reversing
His Position, N.Y. Times (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/us/
politics/joe-biden-hyde-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/7F59-BRYP].
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that he felt like the odd man out in the Democratic Party on the
right to choose, stating that while he personally does not believe in
abortion, he does not believe he has the right to impose his beliefs
on others. The current inaction contradicts Biden’s stated position
that “reproductive rights are a constitutional right. And, in fact,
every woman should have that right.”89 In line with these campaign
statements, Biden took immediate action to confirm this belief
in January of 2021, repealing by executive order Trump’s global
gag rule that restricted international health organizations receiving federal funds from providing abortions and information about
abortions.90 His current inaction feels like a return to past positions.
A pro-choice administration would not leave the women of Texas
to wait for a decision from the Court.
Additionally, Elie Mystal writes about the possibility of using
federal health care providers, which are potentially protected by
qualified immunity, to perform abortions in states with complete or
partial bans.91 Mystal’s suggestion is a viable option in the present
and can presumably work for any future bans that take advantage
of the procedural complexity of S.B. 8. Because qualified immunity
protects federal employees from private lawsuits arising out of the
performance of their jobs, Mystal theorizes that through executive
orders the Biden administration could provide pregnant persons
with a federal option for abortion care even in states with bans.92
Mystal states that Democrats must do something—but to date, the
federal government has only passed the WHPA in the House and
allowed it to linger in the Senate.93 The Biden administration could
use executive orders in ways beyond what Mystal contemplates.
Over the years, Presidents have used executive orders to advance
and reverse policies when Congress has failed to act on issues
including immigration, public health, and national security.94 The
89. The October Democratic debate transcript, Wash. Post (Oct. 16,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/15/october-democratic-
debate-transcript [https://perma.cc/5XEH-5TD2].
90. Press Release, FACT SHEET: President Biden to Sign Executive Orders Strengthening Americans’ Access to Quality, Affordable Health
Care (Jan. 28, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/01/28/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-o rdersstrengthening-americans-access-to-quality-affordable-health-care [https://perma.cc/AJ3W-GHBL].
91. Elie Mystal, What Can Democrats Do to Fight Texas’s Abortion Ban?
Lots, Nation (Sept. 2, 2021) https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/texas-abortion-fight [https://perma.cc/9BFX-5K7D].
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015) (recognizing
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results of the exercise of executive power have been mixed in the
courts, but the orders have, in the short term, provided immediate
relief. If the right to choose is a part of the Biden Administration’s
policy, it could use the executive power to protect that right as Congress and the courts weigh the issue.

Conclusion
The danger of a state-by-state approach to personhood, in
which some states grant personhood to fetuses and prioritize that
fetal personhood above that of the mother, both frustrates the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and creates the potential for
systemic absurdities that I highlight in my tweet.95 The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal protection, thus when a state grants
full personhood to a fetus, that personhood should apply equally.96
the need to address cyber threats, President Obama issued an executive order
to block the property of certain persons engaging in cyber-enabled activities);
Exec. Order No. 13991, 86 Fed. Reg. 7045 (Jan. 20, 2021) (responding to health
risks to federal workforce caused by the pandemic, President Biden issued an
executive order requiring face masks); Exec. Order No. 14013, 86 Fed. Reg. 8839
(Feb. 4, 2021) (addressing the needs of immigrants displaced by climate change,
President Biden issued an executive directing relevant agencies to enhance and
review the refugee resettlement program).
95. Reese Oxner & Neelam Bohra, U.S. Justice Department Sues Texas
Over New Abortion Law That Attorney General Merrick Garland Calls Unconstitutional, Tex. Trib. (Sept. 9, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.
org/2021/09/09/texas-abortion-ban-federal-challenge [https://perma.cc/9BFX-5K7D ] (citing Attorney General Merrick Garland’s statement that the
Texas statute is “invalid under the Supremacy Clause and the 14th Amendment,
is preempted by federal law and violates the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity”).
96. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). For an analysis
of the Equal Protection Clause, see generally Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra
note 7; Hellman, supra note 7; Harris, supra note 7. Although the equal protection clause now requires equal treatment of women, this has not always been
the case. See Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70–4),
1971 WL 133596 at *10; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that
the privileges and immunities clause does not give women the right to vote); In
re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (denying women the right to practice law);
Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. 130 (1872); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 233 U.S. 59,
63 (1912) (allowing discrimination in granting occupational licenses to women).
Black women and Native American women have faced an intersectional denial
of equal protection. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (instituting
the separate but equal doctrine); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (discussing the property rights of Native Americans). Rights for these persons have
been granted incrementally, through constitutional amendments and legislation.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; U.S. Const. amend. XIX; Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L.
88–353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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A conundrum therefore arises, because it is impossible to protect
the purported personhood of a fetus against the rights of a pregnant person without denying the latter’s personhood and their right
to equal protection under the law.
The simple truth is that the right to choose should not be
dependent upon the opinion of five justices on the Supreme Court,
or on whether a woman resides in a red or blue state. Instead, the
other branches of the federal government should act. The message from those who oppose the right to choose is clear—they are
determined to completely ban abortion.97 And they are willing to
do so even if it requires disrupting constitutional principles.98 The
federal government must intervene to ensure that all persons are
given the rights and privileges afforded them through the constitution.99 Equal access to abortion is healthcare and is fundamental
to protecting the personhood of women. If we believe, as a society,
that women are equal and deserving of all freedoms enumerated
by our Constitution, then that is a belief that deserves protection
through an act of Congress. We shouldn’t need Roe to protect the
right to choose.

97. Emma Green, What Texas Abortion Foes Want Next, Atlantic (Sept.
2, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/09/texas-abortionban-supreme-court/619953 [https://perma.cc/GW84-TZXY].
98. Id. (“We want to pass legislation to show the Supreme Court that
they need to tear down and rebuild the legal foundation they have relied upon
when it comes to abortion legislation.”).
99. Fresh Air, The Supreme Court’s Failure to Protect Civil Rights, NPR
(Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/133960082/the-supreme-courtsfailure-to-protect-civil-rights.

